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In the context of an international unionized oligopoly, with vertical 
differentiation and downstream and upstream firms locked in a bilateral 
monopoly, the pattern of downstream mergers is investigated. In such a setting, a 
downstream merger leads to a reduction in the price of the inputs. Such 
reduction is greater the more homogeneous the participants’ products are. 
However, it turns out that most of the market structure equilibria consist of 
mergers among differentiated producers. I find that firms’ strategic behaviour 
impedes mergers between similar producers, avoiding that input prices fall to 
their marginal costs. Given that firms can be harmed by rivals’ mergers, through 
the important reduction in input prices that those trigger, an scenario of 
preemptive mergers emerges. A brief social welfare analysis is also presented. It is 
shown that the market structure outcome is never socially optimal, neither in 
terms of consumer surplus nor social welfare. Nevertheless, the optimum could 
be achieved if antitrust authorities block some strategic mergers, precisely those 
involving more than two firms.  
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International mergers have become an essential characteristic of the industrial organization in
the World. According to the UNCTAD￿ S World Investment Report (2004), cross-border mergers
constitute the key driver of global FDI since 80s, and during the last century several merger waves
took place (see Gugler et al. (2003) for a review). Although economies of scale play an important
role in this issue, there exists an extra incentive to merge internationally rather than nationally:
to curb the market power of trade unions. Baghat et al. (1990) stress that labor costs are the
greatest component of costs in most corporations. Hendricks (1976) ￿nds evidence of lower wages
rates paid by merged employers, who have enhanced their bargaining power through the merger.
Stressing this fact, union leaders argue that the wave of corporate mergers in the 1980s harmed
union members seriously (Peoples et al. (1993)). There are several examples of multinational ￿rms
exploiting this fact, as in the automobile industry, or the food manufacturing industries. In 1998
BMW threatened to close down production at the Rover plant in order to obtain reductions in the
workers￿wages. The threat was successful as workers renounced to the payments for overtime and
saturday working. In Spain, workers of the most important Spanish automobile industry, SEAT,
renounced to increases in wages to produce the new model of Volkswagen Group, the new Audi
Q3. In the food manufacturing industry, a study of the Greek, Spanish and UK operations of the
European food business of a leading multinational, found that a key dimension of competition
between plants, in di⁄erent countries for allocations of production for particular lines, was in
terms of measures introduced via local negotiations, to increase the ￿ exibility of employment and
working practices (see Marginson and Schulten (1999) for a review).
The objective of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, I study how the pro￿tability of down-
stream mergers depends on their capacity to increase competition among trade unions, which are
forced to ￿x lower wages for the merged ￿rms. This result arises in Lommerud et al (2003), in
a setting of horizontal di⁄erentiation, where all the ￿rms produce di⁄erentiated goods. However,
1in my model, di⁄erentiated and non-di⁄erentiated ￿rms coexist. It allows to analyze whether
￿rms prefer to merge with similar or di⁄erentiated producers. On the other hand, I analyze the
strategic behaviour of merged ￿rms, which merge not only to reduce wages through the induced
trade unions￿competition, but also to avoid rivals to behave in the same way, as they anticipate
that mergers harm outsiders. Thus, the aim of this article is to examine the interplay between
the behaviour of input prices (wages) set by upstream ￿rms (trade unions) and the way in which
downstream ￿rms decide to merge.
To this purpose, I examine a model of vertical di⁄erentiation, in a context of an international
unionized oligopoly, shaped by four downstream ￿rms, two of them producing a high quality
good and the other two producing a low quality one. They are settled in four di⁄erent countries,
but compete in a Cournot fashion in a single integrated market. Each of them is locked in a
bilateral monopoly with a unique trade union, which set wages in a unilateral way.1 A downstream
merger implies that the new entity is in touch with two di⁄erent trade unions, and the threat of
replacing sales of its respective products between plants may trigger an strong competition between
unions, which are forced to set lower wages.2 Observe that this result depends very much on the
assumption that each downstream ￿rm is locked in a bilateral monopoly with its own independent
trade union, who cannot sell its input (labour) to any other producer.3 It is also shown that
the threat of shifting labour demand is more e⁄ective as the homogeneity of the good increases.
When the goods are completely homogeneous, competition between trade unions is extremely
￿erce, and wages will tend to their reservation level after a merger. On the other hand, I analyze
the cases where trade unions can be more oriented to achieve either a high level of employment
or a high level of wages. This a⁄ects the downstream market structure once the merger process
1 To the best of my knowledge, this is the ￿rst paper to analyze downstream mergers in a vertical di⁄erentiation
model with upstream market power.
2 It is assumed that trade unions cannot merge for geographical and cultural reasons.
3 Such assumption can be justi￿ed in terms of low mobility of the labour factor. In the case that input suppliers
were pro￿t maximizers ￿rms instead of trade unions, we could think they supply an speci￿c input which leads to
a situation of bilateral monopoly.
2takes place, given that in the former case there is no much room to reduce wages but, in the
latter, reductions could be larger. These results suggest that the most pro￿table mergers should
occur among non-di⁄erentiated ￿rms. This ￿nding contrasts with some real world examples in
which ￿rms merge with di⁄erentiated producers. For example, Volkswagen Group merged with a
vertically di⁄erentiated ￿rm like SEAT or Skoda; Renault acquired Dacia, a lower quality brand,
or BMW merged with Rover. Why do producers of di⁄erent qualities merge among them? Even
though transmission of knowledge between vertically di⁄erentiated ￿rms may help to explain this
kind of mergers, the bene￿ts of extracting rents from trade unions cannot be neglected. By using a
sequential noncooperative game of coalition formation, where all kind of mergers except monopoly
are allowed, I attain that the market structure equilibria is not necessarily shaped by those mergers
leading to the largest reduction in wages. For example, one of the equilibrium mergers comprises
a high quality ￿rm merging with two low quality ones, and the other high quality ￿rm remaining
as an outsider. This is the case when rival products are not highly di⁄erentiated. The reason
is that forcing your most direct rival ￿rm to be an outsider, in a setting where insiders obtain
huge reductions in wages, may be a more attractive scenario than merging with it. Observe that
reductions in wages lead to a larger expansion of the insiders￿output, and a larger loss of market
share for the outsider, the less di⁄erentiated the goods are. Another interesting equilibrium arising
is leaving a low quality ￿rm alone. This is obtained for a high degree of product di⁄erentiation.
Take into account that a merger between two high quality ￿rms could lead the outsiders to react
by merging. Therefore, the high quality ￿rms may try to avoid this second merger by acquiring
one of the low quality outsiders. The reason for the two high quality ￿rms merge is that a
di⁄erentiated merger would not cause an important reduction in wages due to the high degree of
product di⁄erentiation.
Despite the empirical relevance of trade unions in the vast majority of OECD countries, the
literature about this topic is scarce. McGuckin et al. (1995) show in an empirical work that
mergers a⁄ect wages in an ambiguous way. Lommerud et al. (2003) investigate how downstream
3mergers may trigger lower or higher wages in participants and outsiders respectively. Lommerud
et al. (2006) also examine how the presence of trade unions a⁄ects the pattern of downstream
mergers in an international unionized oligopoly. All the ￿rms are horizontally di⁄erentiated, but
the key point is that national mergers are less pro￿table than international ones because the former
do not curb the power of trade unions. The main driver of the mergers is the reduction in wages,
and the market structure equilibrium is shaped by mergers obtaining the maximum reduction
in wages. However, in the present article a di⁄erent result emerges: although mergers between
￿rms producing the same quality trigger the greatest reduction in wages, they rarely occur. Firms
merge strategically to avoid that rivals harm them by merging. This kind of mergers are known
as preemptive mergers. Related papers are Nilssen and Sorgard (1998), who study preemptive
mergers in a setting where mergers produce e¢ ciency gains, or Brito (2003), who shows that, under
spatial competition, preemptive mergers eliminate the risk of being the less bene￿tted outsiders.
In his paper, Brito reports some examples of preemptive mergers. An interesting one occured in
1999. After the announcement of the merger between Paribas and SociØtØ Generale, both banks
were acquired by BNP, France￿ s largest bank, as an attempt not to become an outsider.
Finally, I also analyze a second scenario in which antitrust authorities would block mergers in-
volving three ￿rms. In this new setting it is not possible either to harm a rival by leaving it alone
as an outsider, or trying to avoid a merger which would lead to a loss of market share. As a
consequence, the most pro￿table option is to merge with those ￿rms producing the same quality,
which triggers the strongest reduction in wages. Such a reduction will be transmited to consumers
if trade unions were su¢ ciently wage oriented, and social wefare in this case will be greater than
in any other situation. Thus, in my setting, antitrust authorities should block mergers involving
three ￿rms in order to maximize social welfare.
The plan of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, I present the model. In section 3, the e⁄ects of
di⁄erent types of mergers are analyzed. Section 4 examines welfare in the two di⁄erent settings.
Section 5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
42 The Model
2.1 Consumers
Consider a continuum of consumers4 who di⁄er in tastes, described by the parameter ￿ 2 [￿;￿],
uniformly distributed with unit density. They have the same utility function, U = ￿￿ ￿ p, where
￿ 2 f￿H;￿Lg represents the quality of the good, and for any price p a higher ￿ means a higher
utility for the consumers, implying that they will prefer to pay more for the higher quality good.
I assume that consumers can buy two di⁄erent goods, H and L, with qualities ￿H (high) and
￿L (low), being ￿H > ￿L, and prices pH and pL, respectively. Hence, ￿HL =
pH￿pL
￿H￿￿L is the taste
parameter of the indi⁄erent consumer between buying good H and L, and ￿L? =
pL
￿L between
buying L and nothing, or in other words, buying good L derives no utility for this consumer.
When a consumer has a taste parameter between ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿HL she will buy good H, whereas she
will buy good L when ￿HL > ￿ ￿ ￿L?. Finally, she will not buy at all when ￿ < ￿L?. Given these
consumers￿preferences, the demand functions can be formulated as,












I consider a four-tier industry, consisting of four downstream ￿rms and four trade unions. Each
trade union is assumed to be locked in a bilateral monopoly with one downstream ￿rm,5 as
represented in Figure 1.
4 I use the model purposed by Motta (1993). For simplicity, I do not use subscript for consumers.
5 The existence of bilateral monopolies is a natural assumption when input suppliers are trade unions. I further
assume that trade unions are unable to coordinate their actions, for geographical and/or cultural reasons.
5(Figure 1)
Downstream ￿rms 1 and 2 produce an identical ￿nal good H, with high quality ￿H. Firms 3
and 4 produce good L, with low quality ￿L. For simplicity, I use a production function such that
qi = minfli;kig, where the production of a unit of ￿nal good qi requires a labour unit li at price
wi, and a bundle of components ki at the competitive price ci = c￿i
2. The price of the components
is increasing in quality, as in Shaked and Sutton (1987). By assuming that production costs are
convex in quality, it is favoured that each product maintains an small market share in all the
market structures analyzed (Berry and Waldfogel (2010)). Di⁄erences in quality proceed from
past investments considered now as sunk costs.6
By inverting the demand functions [1] and [2], and given the oligopoly structure of the industry,
the following demands are obtained,
pH = ￿￿H ￿ (q1H + q2H)￿H ￿ (q3L + q4L)￿L (3)
pL = (￿ ￿ q1H ￿ q2H ￿ q3L ￿ q4L)￿L (4)
where q1H; q2H; q3L and q4L are the quantities of ￿nal good produced by downstream ￿rms 1;2;3
and 4 respectively.
3 The Game
Firms play the following three-stage game:
Stage 1: Downstream ￿rms decide whether to merge or not, determining the equilibrium structure
6 Low quality ￿rms 3 and 4 cannot produce a high quality good by using a more expensive bundle of components.
6of the industry. Two cases are analyzed. In the ￿rst case, all the mergers are allowed except
monopoly. In the second one, mergers involving three ￿rms will not be permitted.
Stage 2: Trade unions set prices simultaneously and independently.
Stage 3: Cournot competition in the downstream segment of the market takes place.
In following sections I analyze the game by backward induction, starting from stage three.
3.1 Cournot Competition
Downstream ￿rms compete in a Cournot fashion in a single integrated market. Their respective
pro￿ts functions are,
￿i = (ps ￿ wi ￿ c￿s
2)qis s=H if i=1;2 and s=L if i=3;4 (5)
where qis is the quantity of good s produced by downstream ￿rm i, and wi is the price of one
unit of labour supplied by trade union i. c￿s
2 is the price of the rest of the components used for
producing a unit of ￿nal good s.
By using equations [3] and [4] in [5], the following reaction functions are obtained,
RiH(qjH;q3L;q4L) =









As expected, ￿rms￿output decision depends negatively on rivals￿one. From [6] and [7]; I get the













7 These expressions also represent the labours demand due to the "one to one" relationship between them. For























i;j=3;4 i6=j k=1;2 (14)
Equation [12] shows how labour demands depend negatively on their own prices, and positively
on rivals ones. This e⁄ect is stronger when ￿rms are direct rivals, i.e., produce the same quality
(equations [13] and [14]). Input prices (wages) are strategic complements, which makes that trade
unions face an induced competition. Increases (decreases) in wages bene￿t (harm) rivals￿market
share. When a trade union set a lower wage, the rest of unions will be forced to reduce prices in
order not to lose sales.
3.2 Trade Unions Set Wages
Trade unions set a linear wholesale price per unit of labour supplied, in a unilateral way. I use a
Stone-Geary utility function, given that trade unions maximize the workers￿welfare,
Ui = (wi ￿ $)￿(li)1￿￿
i=1;2;3;4 (15)
where $ is the reservation wage assumed zero for simplicity. The parameter ￿ 2 [0;1] captures
the relative importance of wages and employment for trade unions. When ￿ ! 0 wages tend to
their competitive level because unions only care about employment. This parameter is assumed to
be exogenously given, and it takes the same value for all unions.8 As long as we assumed $ = 0
it can be proved that ￿ = 1
2 corresponds to the case of a pro￿t maximizing ￿rm. Now, I introduce
equations [8] ￿ [11] in [15], writing the maximization problem for trade unions,
8 I will show how the pattern of mergers depends on trade unions￿preferences, ￿. Of course, if each trade union
had di⁄erent preferences, the ￿nal market structure could change. However, once I explain the basic mechanism
that determines the ￿nal market structure equilibrium, it is easy to unsderstand how asymmetric preferences by




s=H if i=1;2 and s=L if i=3;4 (16)
























They satisfy the following properties,
@wi
@￿
> 0 i = 1;2;3;4 (19)
@wi
@￿L
< 0 i = 1;2
@wi
@￿L
> 0 i = 3;4 (20)
As expected, wages depend positively on ￿. If ￿ is high, the trade unions are wage oriented, and
they will set a higher w ceteris paribus. As we will see later, a merger leads the unions to reduce
wages for participants. Thus, the higher ￿ the higher the incentives of downstream ￿rms to merge.
In order to simplify the analysis, I have ￿xed the value of the high quality good, ￿H = 1. Then,
in the next section, I study the di⁄erent market structure equilibria depending on the value of the
low quality good, ￿L 2 [0;1] and the preferences of the trade unions, ￿ 2 [0;1]. If ￿L ! 0, goods
are independent, whereas goods become homogeneous when ￿L ! ￿H = 1. Therefore, equation
[20] shows the behaviour of wages depending on ￿L once ￿H has been ￿xed. As ￿L increases (the
degree of product di⁄erentiation decreases), the low (high) quality ￿rms face a higher (lower)
wage. This is due to the loss of market share of the high quality ￿rms in detriment of low quality
ones when ￿L increases, as ￿H is ￿xed.10




10 To simplify the analysis, I have also assumed that ￿ = 3
2, ￿H = 1 and ￿L 2 [0;1]:For these values, in those
mergers between ￿rms producing di⁄erentiated products, the merged ￿rm still produces both qualities. If instead
it is assumed that ￿ < 3
2, after some of the mergers that I consider, the merged ￿rm may close one of the plants.
This complicates the analysis unnecessarily, as I focus on the pattern of mergers depending on how the reduction
in wages a⁄ects insiders and outsiders.
93.3 The Merger Game
In this section I analyze two kind of mergers, which I call di⁄erentiated and non-di⁄erentiated
mergers. The latter involves mergers between ￿rms producing the same quality (￿rm 1 merges
with 2 or ￿rm 3 merges with 4). In the former, the merged ￿rm produces both qualities. I will show
that non-di⁄erentiated mergers lead wages to their reservation level, whereas di⁄erentiated ones
do not. In principle, we could expect that non-di⁄erentiated mergers should be more pro￿table
and constitute an equilibrium. However, although di⁄erentiated mergers imply a smaller reduction
in wages, they will arise in equilibrium. Two positive e⁄ects can explain this result. First, after a
di⁄erentiated merger, the new ￿rm is going to reallocate production to maximize pro￿ts, increasing
the high quality good in detriment of the low quality one. Second, this kind of mergers can be
strategically used to harm rivals by leaving them as outsiders. These two e⁄ects may compensate
the lower reduction in wages, making downstream ￿rms prefer di⁄erentiated mergers.
To analyze these e⁄ects, I examine a di⁄erentiated merger between ￿rms 1 (high quality) and 3
(low quality). This merger would approximate a non-di⁄erentiated one as ￿L ! ￿H = 1, case
that is going to be analyzed. I use Horn and Persson (2001b) notation. Hence, M13 = f13;2;4g
represents a merger between ￿rms 1 and 3. The subscript gives information about the participants
in the merger, and when it is necessary, a superscript explaining the number of mergers taking
place in the market is included. If M2
13 represents a case where two mergers have occured, one
of them between ￿rms 1 and 3, the other one has to involve ￿rms 2 and 4, given that there is no
other possibility.11
Once the relevant e⁄ects of a merger are explained, I will look for the market structure equilibrium,
where, as we will see, di⁄erentiated mergers will emerge. But let me ￿rst report all the possible
market structures after the merger game. Some of them are identical due to the symmetry of the
model:
11 With respect to variables as pro￿ts, wages, quantities, etc., when it is necessary, they will include a superscript
indicating the market structure they belong to. For the non-merger structure, I do not use superscript at all.
10￿ M13 = f13;2;4g ￿ M14 = f14;2;3g ￿ M23 = f1;23;4g ￿ M24 = f1;24;3g
￿ M2
13 = f13;24g ￿ M2
14 = f14;23g
￿ M12 = f12;3;4g
￿ M34 = f1;2;34g
￿ M2
12 = f12;34g
￿ M134 = f134;2g ￿ M234 = f1;234g
￿ M123 = f123;4g ￿ M124 = f124;3g
￿ M0 = f1;2;3;4g
3.3.1 Reallocating production after merging
Let￿ s assume that the high quality ￿rm 1 merges with the low quality ￿rm 3. The maximization
problem of the merged ￿rm is given by,
max
q1H;q3L
￿13 = (pH ￿ w1 ￿ c￿H
2)q1H + (pL ￿ w3 ￿ c￿L
2)q3L (21)
Solving this problem I get the FOCs, which can be written as,
e R1H(q2H;q3L;q4L) =















Observe that the FOCs of outsiders do not change. The bold terms in equations [22] and [23]
are the terms that did not appear in the benchmark reaction functions12 (equations [6] and
[7]). We can see that the merger has modi￿ed the way in which the production of participants
a⁄ects them. Comparing equations [6] and [22] it is easy to check that the way in which q1H




￿H . Moreover, the comparison between [7] and [23]
shows that this change for the low quality ￿rm has been greater, from 1
2 to 1. Then, the product
interdependence increases for both goods. However, in the case of good 1, the change in the
product interdependence depends on the ratio of qualities, ￿L
￿H , being zero if ￿L
￿H ! 0. To sum up,
the more di⁄erentiated the goods, the smaller the output contraction of downstream ￿rm 1 with
respect to that of ￿rm 3. I summarize this ￿nding in lemma 1.
12 I use the no merger situation as benchmark
11Lemma 1 A merger between ￿rms producing di⁄erentiated goods increases their product
interdependence. This increase is lower for the high quality good, because its change is
weighted by the ratio of qualities, ￿L
￿H .
Scarpa (1998), in a model with three ￿rms producing three di⁄erent qualities, shows how an
increase in the quality of the lowest quality good leads to a reduction of the highest quality.
Competition forces high quality producer to reduce its quality. In my setting, qualities are ￿xed,
and given that the new merged ￿rm cannot choose the optimal qualities, it is going to soften
competition through the reallocation of quantities, by reducing the low quality good more than
the high quality one. In fact, we will see that for a high degree of product di⁄erentiation, the high
quality output of the merged ￿rm increases with respect to the no merger setting even for ￿ = 0.
The merger enhances the optimal production of both goods, in a setting in which ￿rms cannot
choose qualities.
Next I analyze how the labour demands behave after the merger. Let me de￿ne ￿ as the change











j s=H if i=1;2 and s=L if i=3;4 (24)
For insiders,
￿1 =
￿L2(3￿H ￿ ￿L)(6￿H ￿ ￿L)
￿H(9￿H ￿ 4￿L)(￿H ￿ ￿L)(9￿H ￿ ￿L)
> 0 (25)
￿3 =
2(3￿H ￿ ￿L)(6￿H ￿ ￿L)
(9￿H ￿ 4￿L)(￿H ￿ ￿L)(9￿H ￿ ￿L)
> 0 (26)
As expected, the participants￿labour demands become more price responsive, as the merged ￿rm
is able now to shift production between plants, increasing the production of one good in detriment
of the other. As the homogeneity of the products increases, this ability also improves, and when
the goods are identical becomes perfect. Formally,
@￿i
@￿L
> 0 i=1;3 (27)
It can be proved that ￿i ! 1 when ￿L








(9￿H ￿ 4￿L)(9￿H ￿ ￿L)
< 0 (29)
Equations [28] and [29] show that, for outsiders, the response of the labour demands to their own
prices becomes smaller in absolute value.
On the other hand, the change in the response of the labour demands of all ￿rms depends on
quality. This change is more important for low quality ￿rms, given that their response is equal to
that of the high quality ones but weighted by the ratio of qualities. Thus, as the degree of product
di⁄erentiation increases, the change in the response of the labour demands is comparatively less




￿j j=3 if i=1 and j=4 if i=2 (30)
Lemma 2 A merger between ￿rms producing di⁄erentiated goods changes the response of
input demands to their prices. Insiders￿ones become more elastic, whereas outsiders￿ones
more inelastic. Furthermore, those changes are less important for high quality ￿rms, given
that their response are like those of low quality ones but weighted by the ratio of qualities,
￿L
￿H .
In the following section I analyze how these e⁄ects a⁄ect wages.
3.3.2 Reduction in wages after a merger
The maximization problem of trade unions (equation [16]) changes as long as the labour demands









s=H if i=1;2 s=L if i=3;4 (31)
where "i is the price elasticity of the labour demand for trade union i. It depends on two factors:
changes in the labour demand, qis(wi;w_i), and changes in the response of the labour demand to
its price,
@qis(wi;w_ i)
@wi . I refer to these factors as demand and variety e⁄ect, respectively.
Demand e⁄ect The demand e⁄ect summarizes how changes in labour demand modify its
price. In order for equation [31] to hold, as labour demand, qis(wi;w_i), increases (decreases), the
13wage, wi, also has to increase (decrease). Thus, as ￿rms reduce output, they face a lower wage.
The opposite happens when they increase production.
Variety e⁄ect When the merger takes place, the response of the labour demand to its price
changes. This happens to all ￿rms. As
@qis(wi;w_ i)
@wi increases in absolute value (i.e. more responsive
labour demand to its price), the wage, wi, has to be reduced in order for equation [31] to hold.
The opposite happens if the labour demand becomes less price responsive. Equations [25] and
[26] show that the trade unions of insider ￿rms face more price responsive labour demands. The
intuition is as follows. Through the merger, ￿rms become a new larger ￿rm with two productive
plants, and now it is possible for them to increase the production of a plant at expenses of the
other one, depending on their respective costs. This provokes a ￿ercer competition between trade
unions, which set lower wages. I call this e⁄ect the variety e⁄ect. Equation [27] shows that
this e⁄ect is stronger as the goods become more homogeneous. When ￿L
￿H ! 1, competition is
extreme and wages tend to their reservation level. This happens in non-di⁄erentiated mergers,
where participants produce the same quality. On the other hand, if the products are highly
di⁄erentiated, upstream competition relaxes, and the threat of shifting production between plants
becomes ine⁄ective. Equations [28] and [29] show that the labour demands of outsiders become
less price responsive. Given that the downstream industry is now more concentrated, the market
share of outsiders is less responsive to changes in production costs. According to equation [31],
this fact is exploited by trade unions to increase wages. As a result, the variety e⁄ect explains
how insiders obtain a reduction in wages, whereas outsiders face higher ones.
Another interesting point is how qualities a⁄ect the variety e⁄ect. The change in the response of
the labour demand to its price is smaller for high quality ￿rms (equation [30]). This is interesting
because the merged ￿rm bene￿ts from this e⁄ect. We have seen how, after merging, participants
are going to reduce the low quality good more than the high quality one. The low quality outsider
will react increasing its production more than the high quality outsider (equation [14]). This fact
14could make the merger less pro￿table, but as input prices are strategic complements, trade unions
will limit the outsiders￿ouput expansion. On the one hand, the change in the response of the
labour demand to its price for the low quality insider is greater than for the high quality one. This
means a lower wage, set by its trade union to avoid a huge loss of market share. On the other
hand, the change in the response of the labour demand to its price for the low quality outsider
is also greater than for the high quality one, but in this case, as its demand becomes less price
responsive with the merger, it is going to face a higher wage. This higher wage limits the output
expansion of the low quality outsider.
Variety and demand e⁄ects To analyze how both e⁄ects a⁄ect wages after a merger, it
is necessary to distinguish two cases, when ￿ is low (wages are close to their reservation level),
and when ￿ is high (there is much room to decreases in wages). In the ￿rst case, insiders do not
get important reduction in wages, and they reduce ￿nal output and labour demand. Outsiders,
conversely, react increasing both output and labour demand. Thus, the demand e⁄ect pushes
insiders￿wages down and outsiders￿ones up. Therefore, if ￿ is low, the variety and demand
e⁄ects go in the same direction for insiders, decreasing wages. For outsiders, both e⁄ects also
reinforce each other, but increasing wages. In any case, for ￿ close to zero, the free-rider paradox
holds, i.e., the outsiders￿expansion of ￿nal output ruins the pro￿tability of the merger, in spite
of the e⁄ect on wages. However, when ￿ is high the situation overturns. As participants obtain
an strong reduction in wages, they are going to expand production and consequently their labour
demand. This increase of ￿nal output makes outsiders reduce theirs, ending up in a worse situation
than in the no merger setting. This time the free-rider paradox is eliminated. The demand e⁄ect
has now changed. It pushes wages up for insiders, and down for outsiders. In the former case, the
variety e⁄ect o⁄sets the demand e⁄ect, and participants always face a lower wage after any of the
possible mergers. For outsiders the demand e⁄ect dominates the variety e⁄ect, and for high values
of ￿ they face a lower wage. The paradox is that a lower outsiders￿wage means that they have
15lost a considerably market share, and they are worse than before the merger. Firms will take into
account this matter, and they will try to avoid being outsiders, favouring di⁄erentiated mergers.
To sum up, a di⁄erentiated merger does not lead wages to their reservation level, but this allows to
reallocate production, limiting the outsiders￿response as input prices are strategic complements.
Furthermore, as mergers can harm outsiders, a strategic behaviour emerges. We will see how
di⁄erentiated mergers occur to avoid rivals merge, or to leave a direct rival as an outsider.
Figure 2 below plots in the (￿L;￿) space the ￿nal output behaviour after the di⁄erentiated merger
between ￿rms 1 and 3, M13 = f13;2;4g. This is a comparison, for all ￿rms, of ￿nal output with
respect to the no merger setting. In the graph representation, the shadow areas represent the
values of ￿ and ￿L for which the ￿nal output increases after the merger.13
(Figure 2)
Firm 1 increases its ￿nal output as the degree of product di⁄erentiation increases. The opposite
happens for ￿rm 3. This is explained in lemma 1. Hence, outsider 4 increases production when
￿L ! 0 for any value of ￿. It can also be checked that for high values of ￿ insiders expand their
13 The graph representations of this article has been performed by using the software Mathematica (Wolfram)
16￿nal output while outsiders reduce it.
I also include the same graphs for two di⁄erentiated mergers, between ￿rms 1 and 3 and ￿rms 2
and 4, M2
13 = f13;24g. Due to the symmetry of the model, the behaviour of output is the same
for ￿rms 1 and 2, and for ￿rms 3 and 4.
(Figure 3)
In this case, the e⁄ect explained by lemma 1 is clari￿ed. If ￿L is low, high quality insiders
expand ￿nal output even for ￿ = 0. Consequently, low quality ￿rms only expand output when
the reduction in wages is important (￿ high). Di⁄erentiated mergers allow ￿rms to reallocate
production, from low quality to high quality in order to soften quality competition, given that, by
assumption, they cannot choose qualities. In Scarpa (1998), an increase of the low quality level
provokes a reduction of the highest quality. In this setting, the low quality production is reduced.
3.3.3 Ranking of wages
In the following propositions, I rank the wages of di⁄erent market structures. I do it for insiders
and outsiders, and I also distinguish between high and low quality ￿rms. Due to the symmetry of
the model, the behaviour of ￿rm 1 can be extended to ￿rm 2, and similarly for ￿rms 3 and 4.
Proposition 1 In a setting of vertical di⁄erentiation, with trade unions and downstream
￿rms locked in a bilateral monopoly, participants in a downstream merger always face lower
wages than in the no merger situation. The lowest wage corresponds to those mergers between
non-di⁄erentiated ￿rms, and it is equal to the reservation wage. For high quality ￿rms,






























3 = $ = 0. The ￿rst ranking holds for any value of ￿ and ￿L. The








Proposition 1 shows that downstream mergers always lead to a wage reduction. We have seen that
if ￿ is low the demand and variety e⁄ects push wages down. When ￿ is high, the demand e⁄ect
changes, pushing wages up. But the variety e⁄ect always o⁄sets the demand e⁄ect and overall
wages fall. A non-di⁄erentiated merger leads wages to their reservation level. In di⁄erentiated
ones, wages are smaller as participants reduce output (through the demand e⁄ect). That is the
reason why w
fM134g
1 is the lowest wage of all di⁄erentiated mergers. This merger takes place among
￿rms 1, 3 and 4. The low quality insiders have increased output strongly, as their wages have
fallen to their reservation level. This expansion of the low quality output harms the high one, and
the demand e⁄ect pushes w1 down. For the low quality ￿rms the ranking of wages behaves in
the same way. The lowest wage of non-di⁄erentiated mergers corresponds to w
fM123g
3 , where the
output of ￿rm 3 has been reduced by the expansion of high quality ￿rms.
Proposition 2 For high values of ￿ outsiders￿ wages are always lower than no merger
wages. For low values of ￿, they are always higher. The ranking of wages for high quality













1 . It holds for any value of ￿L. For low quality outsiders,













3 . It holds except for low values of ￿L, where w
fM14g
3 > w3,






Proposition 2 shows how the reduction in wages that insiders obtain after merging a⁄ects outsiders.
If ￿ is low such reductions are not signi￿cant, insiders reduce output and outsiders expand it. The
demand and variety e⁄ects reinforce each other for outsiders, increasing wages. If ￿ is high,
insiders increase ￿nal output in detriment of outsiders, whose output falls below the no merger
levels. The demand e⁄ect pushes outsiders￿wages down, prevailing over the variety e⁄ect. Hence,
a lower wage for outsiders is a signal or their loss of market share. In this setting, we will see that
the market structures M134 = f134;2g and M123 = f123;4g constitute equilibria when ￿ is high.
Both cases involve mergers among three ￿rms. In the ￿rst case, M134, ￿rms 3 and 4 have obtained
18the maximum reduction in wages, and ￿rm 1 prefers to merge with them more than obtaining
such reduction by merging with ￿rm 2. The same occurs in the market structure M123, where
￿rm 3 does not merge with ￿rm 4. Two factors can explain it. On the one hand, in propositions




3 are the lowest wages of insiders in di⁄erentiated
mergers. Of course, they do not obtain w = $, but their wages have been reduced drastically.








3 ) are the
second lowest wages for outsiders. Through these mergers, some participants do not obtain the
lowest wage they could obtain, but they harm outsiders considerably, given that the fact that
outsiders face such low wages is motivated by their important loss of market share. Therefore,
downstream ￿rms prefer to harm rivals than obtaining the maximum reduction in the price of the
input. From other point of view, when a merger among three ￿rms occurs, insiders avoid that a
second non-di⁄erentiated merger takes place, given that it would lead to a huge expansion of the
￿nal output, harming the pro￿tability of the ￿rst merger.
3.3.4 Pro￿tability of downstream mergers
There exists an important correspondence between the pro￿tability of the mergers and the be-
haviour of wages. Mergers are pro￿table unless ￿ is not signi￿cant, due to the reduction in wages
that they provoke. Outsiders are worse o⁄ when the potential decrease in wages is high, as their
market shares are seriously harmed by the output expansion of insiders.
Non-di⁄erentiated mergers
Proposition 3 In a setting of vertical di⁄erentiation, with trade unions and downstream
￿rms locked in a bilateral monopoly, mergers between ￿rms producing the same quality are
pro￿table, unless the degree of product di⁄erentiation is low and trade unions are strongly
oriented to employment. ￿
fM12g
12 > ￿1 + ￿2 and ￿
fM34g
34 > ￿3 + ￿4 unless ￿L > 0:45 and
















4 unless ￿L > 0:6
and ￿ ! 0. Outsiders are worse o⁄ with the merger if trade unions are wage oriented.
￿
fM12g
3 < ￿3 and ￿
fM34g
1 < ￿1 if ￿ > 0:4 8￿L
Proof. Appendix
19Proposition 3 shows that merging with a direct rival is always pro￿table, unless ￿rms are not
di⁄erentiated and wages before merging are close to their reservation level. This kind of mergers
are very attractive because they force trade unions to set wages at the competitive level. But if the
decrease in wages is not signi￿cant, the strong competition ruins the pro￿tability of such mergers.
With respect to outsiders, proposition 3 shows how they are damaged by the merger unless ￿ < 0:4.
A merger between non-di⁄erentiated producers provokes a huge expansion of output if ￿ is not too
low. In the next section, we will see that the market structure M2
12 = f12;34g is an equilibrium.
This happens when ￿ is low and the degree of product di⁄erentiation is high. The following

























< 0 8￿;￿L (32)
Once two non-di⁄erentiated mergers take place, all the wages are set to their reservation level.
Both new ￿rms are going to expand their respective production. In equation [32] we can see
how, as the degree of product di⁄erentiation decreases, the high quality ￿rms lose market share in
favour of low quality ones. Furthermore, the competition of low quality ￿rms harms total pro￿ts.
This matter has been analyzed in the case of di⁄erentiated mergers, where the new ￿rm reduces
low quality output in favour of high quality one. Thus, this market structure emerges when ￿ is
low and products are di⁄erentiated. The former limits the output expansion, the latter softens
competition.
Di⁄erentiated mergers
Proposition 4 Mergers between di⁄erentiated ￿rms are pro￿table unless trade unions are
strongly oriented to employment. ￿
fM13g









4 if ￿ > 0:10 8￿L. Outsiders are worse o⁄ with the merger if trade unions
are wage oriented.
Proof. Appendix
Proposition 4 shows that mergers between di⁄erentiated ￿rms are pro￿table whenever ￿ is not
close to zero. The shadow areas in the graphs of ￿gure 4, represent the values of ￿ and ￿L for
20which ousiders of the di⁄erentiated merger M13 = f13;2;4g have increased pro￿ts with respect
to the no merger setting. The situation of outsiders is similar to the one in the non-di⁄erentiated
merger case. But ￿gure 4 shows that the low quality outsider is always bene￿tted by the merger
if ￿L is low enough. In lemma 1 we saw that, whenever ￿L < ￿H, the low quality insider reduces
production more than the high quality one, and this di⁄erence depends on ￿L. Obviously, the
response of the low quality outsider is greater for low values of ￿L.
(Figure 4)
Finally, the market structure M2
13 = f13;24g also emerges as equilibrium, whenever the degree of
product di⁄erentiation and ￿ are low. In picture 3 we saw how for the values for which M2
13 is
an equilibrium, both merged ￿rms reduce output with respect to the benchmark. And that is the
reason for which it is an equilibrium. As ￿L is high, ￿rms obtain important reduction in wages
by merging, but not high enough (￿ is low) as to expand their output and harming mutually.
Mergers among three ￿rms
Proposition 5 Mergers among three ￿rms are always pro￿table. Outsiders are worse o⁄ if






















2 < ￿2 if ￿ > 0:55.
Proof. Appendix
Proposition 5 shows that three ￿rms mergers are always pro￿table. If ￿ is low, insiders reduce
output, and the outsider bene￿ts from the merger. Of course, the opposite happens when a high









> 0 unless ￿ and ￿L are high (33)
As we said before, M123 = f123;4g emerges in equilibrium for high values of ￿ and a high degree
of product di⁄erentiation. For these values, the low quality insider reduces production in a strong
way (lemma 1), whereas the high quality ￿rms are almost una⁄ected. The former is going to obtain
an extra reduction in its wage (lemma 2), because its trade union does not want to lose market
share, and the low quality outsider will face a higher wage as its production increases, limiting
its capacity to harm participants (lemma 2). Equation [33] shows how a tougher competition (a
higher ￿L) harms participants, even implying a lower wage for the low quality insider (a higher ￿L
implies a stronger variety e⁄ect, and a lower wage for the low quality insider). This is the reason
why M123 = f123;4g is not an equilibrium for high values of ￿L.
Observe that M134 = f134;2g is also one of the market structure equilibria. This occurs for high
values of ￿ and a low degree of product di⁄erentiation.
@￿134
@￿L





< 0 8￿;￿L (34)
In this case, insiders bene￿t from the increase of ￿L, as the low quality ￿rms are stealing market
share to high quality ones. The increasing in ￿L also provokes a reduction in w1, and the reduction
is stronger because the input prices are strategic complements: trade unions 1 and 2 reduce wages
in order not to lose market share. When ￿L is very high, all the participants have obtained a
huge reduction in wages, expanding output in detriment of the outsider, who is worse o⁄ after the
merger.
3.3.5 Downstream market structure equilibrium
We know that in a Cournot setting with linear costs, mergers are unpro￿table due to the fact
that insiders reduce their output whereas outsiders expand their own. This leads to the well
known free-rider paradox, (Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, 1983). But we have also seen that,
22in my setting, the situation overturns. Downstream mergers lead to a reduction of the price of
inputs, insiders expand production in detriment of outsiders. In this section, I analyze which ￿nal
market structure arises after the merger process. I do it using a sequential non-cooperative game
of coalition formation, that takes place before trade unions set wages. All mergers are allowed
except those implying monopoly. Thus, in this setting is feasible that a high quality ￿rm joins
with all the ￿rms producing the low quality, or that both high quality ￿rms acquire a low quality
one. Downstream ￿rms play a four-stage game, solved by backward induction. The merger process
is endogenized, and it is characterized by the following rules. At the ￿rst stage of the game, a
high quality ￿rm is given the opportunity of bidding for any other ￿rm. Due to the symmetry of
the model, it does not matter if the initial bidder is ￿rm 1 or 2. Firms bid in a natural order,
1;2;3 and 4, and accept an o⁄er whenever their pro￿ts are higher or equal than refusing it. After
merging, the new entity makes a new bid, except if it implies monopoly. Firms can only bid
one time, unless the market structure changes. If all the high quality bids fail, but ￿rms 3 and
4 merge, ￿rms 1 and 2 have another possibility to bid. Of course, if all bids are rejected, the
game ends with no mergers. For the parameter values used in this setting, high quality ￿rms are
always more pro￿table than low quality ones. Thus, for simplicity, it is assumed that ￿rms 3 and
4 cannot make bids on ￿rms 1 and 2, neither individually nor after an hypothetical union between
them. This assumption could be interpreted as if only bigger ￿rms were able to acquire smaller
ones. Also for simplicity, repeated bids are not allowed. If ￿rm 2 refuses to merge with 1, ￿rm 2
cannot make a bid for ￿rm 1, unless the market structure changes. The equilibrium concept used
is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.14 Once the equilibrium has been derived,
the main results are summarized in the following proposition,
14 The representation of the game has been relegated to Appendix
23Proposition 6 The equilibrium market structure of the sequential non-cooperative game
of coalition formation, allowing for all kind of mergers except monopoly is as follows: (i)
A merger among two high quality ￿rms and one low quality ￿rm emerges if the goods are
di⁄erentiated enough, ￿L < 0:5, and wages are not close to their reservation level, ￿ > 0:3;
(ii) For ￿ > 0:3, a high quality ￿rm acquiring two low quality ones is an equilibrium whenever
the goods are not highly di⁄erentiated, ￿L > 0:5; (iii) Mergers between ￿rms producing the
same quality occur if ￿L < 0:6 and ￿ < 0:3; (iv) Mergers between two ￿rms producing
di⁄erentiated products appear for ￿ < 0:3 and ￿L > 0:6; (v) When the goods are almost
homogeneous, and wages are close to their reservation level, mergers do not occur.
Proof. Appendix
Proposition 6 is represented in ￿gure 5 to make easier its comprehension,
(Figure 5)
The ￿gure has four di⁄erent regions. Each of them represents a di⁄erent market structure equi-
librium, indicated in brackets. First of all, let me consider the ￿￿threshold 0:3. Above this value
equilibria always involve mergers among three ￿rms. Below it, mergers occur between two ￿rms.
Consider now the ￿L￿threshold 1
2. For smaller values, in all equilibria, high quality ￿rms merge.
However, for ￿L > 1
2 this never happens.
Region I. Equilibrium, fHH; LLg In this region the products are di⁄erentiated, and the
potential bene￿ts of obtaining reductions in wages are limited because ￿ is low. Two non-
di⁄erentiated mergers provoke that all the trade unions set wages at their reservation level. These
24strong reductions could trigger a huge expansion of the output of all downstream ￿rms, leading to
a ￿erce competition. However, as long as ￿ and ￿L are low, the reduction in wages will be limited,
while the competition will be also softened through the high degree of product di⁄erentiation.
Region II. Equilibrium, fHHL; Lg Now, there is much room for reduction in wages. For
￿ > 0:3, the equilibrium changes from fHH; LLg to fHHL; Lg. High quality ￿rms are not willing
to be harmed by the output expansion that a merger between low quality ￿rms would provoke.
Lemma 1 shows how, for a high degree of product di⁄erentiation, the low quality insider reduces
its output in favour of high quality insiders. The response of the low quality outsider is dampened
by the increase in its wage (lemma 2).
Region III. Equilibrium, fHLL; Hg In this merger, the high quality ￿rms are harmed by the
strong output expansion of the low quality producers, given that the degree of product di⁄erenti-
ation is low and ￿ is high. However, as input prices are strategic complements, the trade unions
of the high quality ￿rms reduce their wages, in order not to lose market share. Furthermore, the
high quality insider also gets an important reduction in its wage through the variety e⁄ect (￿L
is close to ￿H). Thus, all the insiders obtain an important reduction in wages, expanding their
production in detriment of the high quality outsider.
Region IV. Equilibrium, fHL; HLg When ￿ is low, ￿rms try to obtain gains from the reduc-
tion of the ￿nal output. For a low value of ￿L, fHH; LLg is an equilibrium because competition
is softened trough the degree of product di⁄erentiation, and trade unions set wages at their com-
petitive level. As ￿L increases, the level of competition increases, and ￿rms reduce it by merging
with di⁄erentiated rivals.
Region V. Equilibrium, fH;H;L;Lg For ￿L > 0:6 and wages close to their reservation level,
no merger is pro￿table. Competition ruins such pro￿tability, as in Salant et al (1983).
25To sum up, when ￿ is low, and wages are close to their reservation level, downstream ￿rms merge
trying to soften competition, reducing output and increasing ￿nal prices. In equilibrium, in the
market structures fHH; LLg and fHL; HLg, it can be proved that the production of both goods
falls and ￿nal prices increase, with respect to the no merger setting. Both mergers are clearly
anti-competitive. When ￿ is high, downstream ￿rms merge to curb the market power of trade
unions, but they also do it to impede that rivals merge, avoiding an important expansion of the
rivals￿production.
Finally, we can check that if trade unions were ￿rms maximizing pro￿ts (￿ = 1
2), equilibria would
be fHHL; Lg for ￿L < 1
2, and fHLL; Hg for ￿L > 1
2
3.4 Restricted Merger Game
In this case I repeat the previous sequential non-cooperative game of coalition formation, but
adding a new restriction: no mergers involving three ￿rms are allowed. Neither the characteristics
of the game nor the assumptions we made change. The following proposition summarizes the
derived equilibria from this restricted game,
Proposition 7 The equilibrium market structure of the sequential non-cooperative game
of coalition formation, with mergers not involving more than two ￿rms is as follows: (i)
Mergers between two ￿rms producing di⁄erentiated products emerge if the goods are not
highly di⁄erentiated, and ￿ 2 (0:08; 0:4); (ii) No merger takes place if ￿L > 0:60 and ￿
is close to zero; (iii) Mergers between ￿rms producing the same quality occur in the rest of
cases.
Proof. Appendix
Proposition 7 is also represented in the following ￿gure,
26(Figure 6)
The graphic representation is as the previous one. By not allowing mergers involving three ￿rms,
a unique equilibrium is basically obtained: two mergers between ￿rms producing the same quality.
Wages are set to their reservation level and, as we will see in the following section, social welfare
is maximized whenever ￿ is high. Of course, in the area where the market structure fHL; HLg
emerged, it appears again. For high values of ￿ the equilibria involving three ￿rms have been
replaced by non-di⁄erentiated mergers. Once strategic behaviours are eliminated, ￿rms try to
obtain the highest gains from trade unions.
4 Welfare Analysis
In this section I make a comparison in terms of social welfare, comparing the market structures
arising in the two described settings. In the restricted one, the equilibria is essentially based
on mergers between non-di⁄erentiated producers. We have seen that such mergers induce more
upstream competition, leading wages to their reservation level. In the no restricted setting, some
strategic behaviours make that downstream ￿rms prefer mergers which trigger smaller reduction in
wages. This section try to clarify whether a strong reduction in wages is transmitted to consumers,
increasing social welfare. In that case, we would be better o⁄ by not allowing mergers involving
three ￿rms. Given that for ￿ < 0:3 the two models basically give us the same equilibria, I only
27have to compare three market structures in terms of social welfare, de￿ned as the sum of consumer
surplus, downstream pro￿ts and the trade unions total rents.
Following Motta (1993), the consumer surplus has been computed as,
Z ￿HL
￿L?
(￿￿L ￿ pL)d￿ +
Z ￿
￿HL
(￿￿H ￿ pH)d￿ (35)
Downstream pro￿ts have been obtained by using equation [5]. With respect to trade unions, I
have used two methods, leading to the same result. The former is to compute the value of their
Stone-Geary utility functions (equation [15]). The latter, according the following formula,
￿TD
j = (wj ￿ $)qj j=1;2;3;4 8￿ (36)
Proposition 8 (i) The market structure de￿ned by fHH; LLg, is socially superior, in terms
of consumer surplus, to any other market structure, whenever ￿ > 0:4; (ii) Furthermore,
fHH; LLg is the socially optimal market structure in terms of global welfare, whenever
￿ > 0:4.
Proof. Appendix
Proposition 9 (i) Consumer surplus in the no merger setting is greater than in any other
market structure, whenever ￿ < 0:4; (ii) If ￿ < 0:4, total welfare is maximized with no
mergers.
Proof. Appendix
It can be proved that, in the market structure fHH; LLg, both new merged ￿rms expand their
output for values of ￿ above 0:4. Even though the merged participants prefer not to increase
production, the reduction in wages is so important that output grows. This leads to a reduction
in ￿nal prices, and a higher level of consumer surplus. Furthermore, social welfare is maximized
in this market structure for ￿ > 0:4. As downstream ￿rms obtain bene￿ts from merging, the
ones who lose are the trade unions. However, their losses are o⁄set by the bene￿ts of consumers
and downstream ￿rms. For values of ￿ below that threshold, all the mergers turn out to be anti-
competitive, given that they lead to a reduction in the ￿nal output. Maximizing welfare implies
that the regulator should block any downstream merger when trade unions have strong preferences
for employment. When the preferences are focused on wages, regulator should impede mergers
28involving three ￿rms. This would lead to mergers provoking huge reductions in wages, transmitted
to consumers through lower ￿nal prices and a greater production.
5 Concluding remarks
Downstream mergers can trigger changes in wages of participants and outsiders, and as a con-
sequence, they may also a⁄ect the pro￿tability of such mergers. I have examined, in an context
of international unionized oligopoly and vertical di⁄erentiation, how the presence of trade unions
a⁄ects the pattern of mergers. The aim of this article has been to investigate if such pattern is
only determined by the gains obtained from reductions in wages. We have seen how downstream
mergers leading to the strongest reductions in wages, rarely occur. As in real life, mergers take
place between ￿rms producing di⁄erentiated goods. When the potential gains of extracting rents
from trade unions are not signi￿cant, ￿rms do not worry about rivals, they merge in order to ob-
tain the maximum gains from trade unions. But if the level of wages is high enough, downstream
￿rms are not willing to be outsiders. The free-rider paradox is eliminated, given that the great
reduction in wages that participants obtain, harms the outsiders seriously. Then, mergers among
three ￿rms occur. This kind of mergers really involves two: a non-di⁄erentiated merger and a
di⁄erentiated one. The former triggers a huge reduction in wages, the latter avoids that rivals can
get it. As in so many cases, ￿rms￿behaviour aparts from the social optimum. Mergers between
non-di⁄erentiated ￿rms lead to lower ￿nal prices because of the huge expansion of ￿nal produc-
tion, motivated by the reduction in wages. It increases the consumer surplus, and maximizes total
welfare. But it has been shown how downstream ￿rms behave strategically avoiding this kind of
mergers. In this case, the production will be smaller, and the ￿nal prices higher. I also show how
to achieve the social optimum. It is enough that the regulator blocks mergers involving three ￿rms
in order to obtain the desirable equilibrium. In any case, the question of welfare can be analyzed
from a global or a particular point of view, with di⁄erent results depending on the countries where
the losers belong to.
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Proofs
Proofs of Propositions 1-5
Due to the extension of the main variables of the di⁄erent market structures in this paper, I do not
include them in this Appendix. They are available upon request. Ranking of wages and pro￿ts
reported in propositions 1-5 has been performed by solving simple but rambling algebra. The
software used to this purpose is Mathematica (Wolfram).
Proof of Proposition 6
I report the tree of the game. In order to make easier the proof, when it is necessary, I assign
a letter to each node. Due to the extension of the game, the tree is represented in three graphs
(￿gures 8;9 and 10), depending on whether ￿rm 1 starts bidding for ￿rm 2;3 or 4. The game is
solved by backwards induction. The equilibrium concept used is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies.
Firstly, I solve node (a) in ￿gure 8. In the ￿rst stage of the game, ￿rm 1 bids for ￿rm 2. Firm 2
accepts and the new merged ￿rm 12 bids for ￿rm 3, which refuses the o⁄er. Thus, in node (a), ￿rm
3 bids for ￿rm 4. If ￿rm 4 refuses, it obtains the pro￿ts corresponding to the market structure
f12;3;4g, i.e., ￿
fM12g
4 , whereas ￿rm 3 obtains ￿
fM12g
3 . Thus, ￿rm 4 accepts any o⁄er equal or
higher than ￿
fM12g









3 . Figure 7 below plots in the (￿L;￿) space the region where inequality holds. In the graph
representation, the shadow area represents the values of ￿L and ￿ for which the market structure
equilibrium is M = f12;34g. The other region corresponds to the case in which the merger is not
pro￿table and the market structure equilibrium is M = f12;3;4g.
(Figure 7)
Due to the extension of the proof, I skip the resolution of the rest of the nodes. A mathematica




Proof of Proposition 7
I report the tree of the game. In order to make easier the proof, when it is necessary, I assign a
letter to each node. The game is solved by backwards induction. The equilibrium concept used is
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. A mathematica ￿le is available upon request.
32This ￿le can be run, obtaining the equilibria graphs of each node.
(Figure 11)
Proof of Proposition 8
I compute the consumer surplus, for all the analyzed market structures, according to the equation
[35]: Using simple algebra, it is straightforward that the value of consumer surplus in the market
structure fHH;LLg, is higher than any other for ￿ > 0:4. I compute the value of downstream
pro￿ts using equation [5], and the value of the utility of trade unions with equation [15]. I compute,
for all the analyzed market structures, the sum of consumer surplus, downstream pro￿ts and the
value of the utility of trade unions. Using simple algebra is straightforward that this value for the
market structure fHH;LLg is superior than any other for ￿ > 0:4. I repeat the previous operations
but substituing the value of the utility of trade unions by total rents of workers (equation [36]).
The initial result does not change.
Proof of Proposition 9
I compute the consumer surplus, for all the analyzed market structures, according to the equation
[35]: Using simple algebra, it is straightforward that the value of consumer surplus in the market
structure fH;H;L;Lg, is higher than any other for ￿ < 0:4. I compute the value of downstream
pro￿ts using equation [5], and the value of the utility of trade unions with equation [15]. I
compute, for all the analyzed market structures, the sum of consumer surplus, downstream pro￿ts
and the value of the utility of trade unions. Using simple algebra is straightforward that this
value for the market structure fH;H;L;Lg is superior than any other for ￿ < 0:4. I repeat the
previous operations but substituing the value of the utility of trade unions by total rents of workers
(equation [36]). The initial result does not change.
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